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Some inventions never see the light of day. Others enter the
spotlight after long delays and the factors that slowed the arri-
val of that innovation are ignored. Technology suppression is a
real occurrence involving well known and widely used products.
In this Article, we examine the topic of technology suppression,
seeking to reveal the tactics of suppression and the patterns and
conditions under which it occurs. Current examples of US
technologies are used to highlight the significance of this phe-
nomenon. We consider related factors, including market and
innovation forces, and we identify suppressive tactics, using illus-
trative cases where patent nonuse or abuse has occurred. Once
suppression is more fully understood, we assess the legal and
policy implications, including potential deterrents to the prob-
lem.
The right of suppression... came into the law over a cen-
tury after the first patent act was passed... [Ilt is time to
be rid of that rule. It is inconsistent with the Constitution
and the patent legislation which Congress has enacted.'
1. Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 380-381 (1945)(Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Douglas's position echoes that of Judge Blodgett who, in 1886, wrote that a
patentee "is bound either to use the patent himself or allow others to use on reasonable or
equitable terms." Hoe v. Knap, 27 F. 204, 212 (N.D. Ill. 1886).
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[W]e answer that such exclusion may be said to have been
the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is
the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it,
without question of motive.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology suppression "is the shelving of an invention3 which oth-
ers would like to manufacture or use if they knew about it, and implies
that the patented product or process is as good or even better than any
other already in use." Thus, suppression involves the nonuse and non-
diffusion of a developed technology by those who control that
technology.5 The investigation of technology suppression is particularly
challenging because, for the most part, the literatures of management
science and strategic research and development make little acknowl-
edgment of its existence,6 and because the courts have been reluctant to
view this conduct as unlawful. These omissions oblige us to reconsider
both the legality of suppression and its legitimacy as a competitive tac-
tic. Recent developments and news reports regarding, for example,
"safer" cigarettes, alternative vehicles, and pharmaceutical products, all
confirm that technology suppression is a real and ongoing phenomenon.
Those who concede that suppression occurs are often tempted to
downplay its impact in one of two ways. Some assert that technology
suppression is all about technology merit; in other words, patented tech-
nologies that are deliberately not used are inherently inferior or
unmarketable. Others insist upon reductive explanations, arguing for
2. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
3. Some distinguish between an invention that is formally described in a patent ap-
plication, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(a),l12 (2000), and an innovation which represents the
market introduction of the invention in product form. Our concern is with the latter-the
introduction of the invention into the marketplace. Tornatzky & Fleischer define technologi-
cal innovation as the "situationally new development and introduction of knowledge derived
tools, artifacts, and devices by which people extend and interact with their environment."
Louis G. Tornatzky & Mitchell Fleischer, THE PROCESSES OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
11 (1990). We use the terms "technology" and "innovation" interchangeably.
4. Floyd L. Vaughan, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY 227 (1956).
5. See Richard Dunford, The Suppression of Technology as a Strategy for Controlling
Resource Dependence, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 512, 513 (1987); Richard Fellmuth, Suppression
and Other Antitrust Concerns, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOLAR TECHNOLOGY 197-216 (John H.
Minon & William H. Lawrence, eds. 1981); S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM ET AL., FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS 873-74 (4th ed. 1981).
6. See, Dunford, supra note 5, at 513.
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instance that only a monopoly would suppress patented technologies.7
We believe that suppression is a more nuanced problem requiring
greater investigation--one that does not seek to draw bright lines, and
make black and white distinctions. Our intent is to demonstrate that
technology suppression occurs.
We submit that our message is important for innovators and entre-
preneurs who want to secure the best chance that their innovations will
not be suppressed as a result of an acquisition, exclusive licensing ar-
rangement, or an in-house decision to shelve a technology. R&D
managers are operating in a domain where their own organization, or a
competitor's, may be the victim or perpetrator of suppressive tactics.
Ultimately, we will propose strategies for deterring suppression and lim-
iting its effects, thus making it more difficult for those who intend to
block innovations.
II. APPROACH
Our approach to researching technology suppression can be de-
scribed as exploratory. Initially, we were concerned with the legal
aspects of technology maturation and diffusion processes. In reviewing
these issues, we became interested in what happened when these proc-
esses were disrupted or frustrated through technology suppression.
To better understand this phenomenon, we examined suppression
from several perspectives. First, we reviewed the few existing overview
articles on technology frustration8 to identify additional leads and sources,
including legal cases. We were already aware of several Twentieth Cen-
tury examples, including electric lamps, solar energy, and pain control
devices. Simultaneously, we reviewed research on how software tools
could be used to search patent databases to identify promising innovations
and relationships between and within patent families.9 Of particular inter-
est was whether or not companies deliberately amassed patents in order to
remain competitive or to block rivals in their technology areas. To an-
swer this question, we conducted exploratory patent searches with the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Official Gazette to determine which compa-
7. Gilbert & Newberry, infra note 83, at 517-18; Tirole, infra note 80, at 393;
Scherer, infra note 51, at 428; Shepherd, infra note 76, at 151-52.
8. See, e.g., Dunford, supra note 5; Bernhard J. Stem, The Frustration of Technology,
Sci. & Soc'y 3 (1937).
9. Mary Ellen Mogee, Using Patent Data to Identify and Assess Technology Transfer
Opportunities at Government Laboratories, in Proceedings of the 18th Annual Meeting of
the Technology Transfer Society, Ann Arbor, Michigan (June 26-29, 1993).
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nies might be accumulating patents in areas that we had previously iden-
tified. Here, our findings were inconclusive.'0
Second, we conducted library searches to identify legal cases and
other instances reporting suppression. In all, we identified forty docu-
mented circumstances. Some of these were set aside because they were
about related matters." We were obliged to consider different cases and
histories of suppression, resulting in a heterogeneous data set. A subset
of twenty cases and histories was carefully reviewed. For each, we gen-
erated a detailed description, which consisted of a summary of the facts,
court's decision, issues that we saw as left unresolved by the decision,
and new lines of inquiry about suppression.
We were attempting to build a predictive model to account for when
suppression was more likely to occur. Eventually, we were forced to
abandon this effort because we found suppression to be context-
dependent, comprising dozens of factors and attributes (e.g., inadequate
finances, incompetence of patent owners, delay in development of in-
ventions, sunk costs, product and geographic markets, etc). However, we
remained interested in patterns of suppressive behavior-and whether
(a) certain types of innovations were more likely to be suppressed, and
(b) certain market conditions were more conducive to suppression. In-
tuitively, it appeared to us that radical or revolutionary innovations
might be more likely candidates for suppression. We analyzed innova-
tions from the set of twenty cases and histories using the theoretical
framework developed by Abernathy and Clark. 2 Our intuitions were
mistaken; we discovered that all types of innovations had been sup-
pressed.
In parallel, we attempted an economic analysis of technology
change and market concerns, guided by the hypothesis that suppression
was more likely to occur in highly concentrated markets.' Our hypothe-
sis appeared to be borne out, although we lacked necessary additional
10. A patent thicket results when the number of the overlapping patents in an industry
is so dense that potential innovators cannot easily obtain the licenses necessary to conduct
further research, thereby blocking follow-on innovations. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL'Y
AND THE EcON. 119, 121 (2001). At least one commentator disputes this approach to analyz-
ing patent relationships that may stifle innovation and does so within the context of the
software industry. See Ronald J. Mann, The Myth of the Software Patent Thicket: An Empiri-
cal Investigation of the Relationship Between Intellectual Property and Innovation in
Software Firms, Research Paper No. 022 (2004), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=510103.
11. Listing of documents available upon request from authors.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 91-97.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 71-89.
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information on the industries and product markets that would have al-
lowed us to reach a definitive conclusion.
In the end, while we were unable to create a prescriptive model de-
rived from innovation and market factors, we were able to devise a
descriptive set of categories of suppressive tactics. A number of cases
were selected to illustrate the use of these tactics, demonstrating the
longevity of suppression, and its ongoing nature. Our inquiry led us to
realize that anticipating and preventing suppression is nearly impossi-
ble. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of suppression can be better
understood and business practices and legal measures can be put in
place to reduce the likelihood of suppression and abbreviate its stifling
effect.
A few final clarifications about our approach are in order. Our focus
is on U.S. technologies and the U.S. patent system. We make no claims
about suppression globally or in other nations. The U.S. has taken a
strong property rights stance, whereas some other nations have admitted
that suppression can occur and have remedies in place to address it
when it does occur.
The cases we present are selective, intended as exemplars to repre-
sent key tactics of suppressive behavior. Moreover, we have not traced
these technologies to see if they were commercialized any where else at
any time; nor have we attempted to evaluate the superiority or market-
ability of these technologies. Such research would be extremely time-
consuming and outside our current scope. Rather, our concern is with
the issue of suppression and how the legal system may have created or
contributed to this problem. The sources for our research come from
documented reports, histories, journal articles, and fact patterns as set
down in legal cases. Musings and explanations for why inventors may
have done what they did fall beyond the scope of this investigation.
III. How ARE TECHNOLOGIES BEING SUPPRESSED TODAY?
Suppression is not simply a historical curiosity involving obscure
technologies. Rather, it is a real occurrence involving well known and
widely used products. While some inventions never see the light of day,
others enter the spotlight after long delays and the factors that slowed
the arrival of that innovation are ignored. In part, this is because sup-
pression is most often recognized in hindsight; it is extremely difficult
to detect suppression while it is occurring. In the following discussion,
we identify several innovations only recently revealed as having been
suppressed.
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A. Liggett & Myers and the "Safer" Cigarette
In the 1960s, Liggett & Myers Company researchers believed that
they had discovered which constituents of cigarette smoke were car-
cinogens, and that they had found a way to remove them. Despite
Liggett officials' belief that the resulting product was commercially vi-
able, Liggett's "safer" cigarette, a product called "XA," was never
marketed and the XA project was abandoned. 4 Liggett did so for two
reasons. First, disclosing the feasibility of a safer cigarette would imply
that other, existing cigarettes were unsafe. Second, Philip Morris threat-
ened Liggett with reprisal if Liggett violated an industry agreement not
to disclose negative information on smoking and health. Liggett's Assis-
tant Research Director, Dr. James Mold, reported that Liggett's
president said that he was "told by someone in the Philip Morris Com-
pany that if we tried to market such a product that they would clobber
us."'5 During the XA project, Liggett attempted to insulate the research
by the use of company lawyers. Dr. Mold reported that after 1975, "all
meetings that we had regarding this project were to be attended by a
lawyer .... All paper that was generated ... [was] to be directed to the
Law Department."' 6 Dr. Mold added that lawyers even collected all the
notes after each meeting. He stated that despite its significance, the
company lawyers not only ultimately succeeded in stopping the project,
but they also ordered him not to publish the results.'
Liggett had also obtained a patent for the process it had discovered
to produce its safer cigarette. The patent application described the re-
duction in cancer in studies of mice, prompting stories in the media that
Liggett was the first cigarette company to admit that smoking caused
14. See First Am. Compl., 112, City & County of San Francisco v. Philip
Morris, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1996)(No. C-96-2090-DLJ), available at http://stic.neu.edu/ ca/sf/
lstamcomplaint.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2002). Liggett began its research by repeating the
smoke condensate painting studies of mice performed by another researcher through a con-
tract with a consulting firm. The consulting firm confirmed the findings, and, in 1968,
Liggett began "a tobacco additive program designed to reduce or eliminate the tumorigenic
activity of cigarette smoke." Id. at 113. By 1979, Liggett declared the work a success, stat-
ing: "Briefly, as a result of 20 years effort in cooperation with [the consulting firm], we have
developed a cigarette system which produces smoke of reduced biological activity ....
[T]here can be no argument that the use of the additives has resulted in a product with lower
carcinogenic effects." Id.
15. Id. at 115.
16. Id. at 116.
17. When later asked why Liggett never marketed the safer XA cigarette, Dr. Mold
explained that: "[Management] felt that such a cigarette if put on the market would seriously
indict them for having sold other types of cigarettes that didn't contain this, for example. Or
that they were carrying on this biological research at the same time saying it meant nothing."
Id. at 118.
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cancer.'8 Liggett responded by issuing a press release which stated:
"Liggett and the cigarette industry continue to deny, as they have consis-
tently, that any conclusions can be drawn relating such test results on
mice in laboratories to cancer in human beings. It has never been estab-
lished that smoking is a cause of human cancer."'9 At the time it issued
this denial, Liggett estimated that it had spent a total of $10 million on
research involving mice, in part to develop the safer XA cigarette.20 De-
spite overwhelming scientific evidence, and the confirmation of this
evidence by their own internal research, the cigarette manufacturers and
their trade associations claimed for decades, in a unified stance, that
there was no causal connection between cigarette smoking and cancer.
Recent settlements in cases brought against cigarette manufacturers in-
dicate some willingness to finally acknowledge their responsibility.
B. Pharmaceuticals: Amgen and EPO,
Brand and Generic Drugs
Erythropoietin (EPO) has proven to be extremely effective in en-
couraging the development of oxygen-carrying red blood cells and has
saved many anemic people, including premature infants, and those with
anemia due to kidney failure or other disease. 2' However, recombinant
bio-engineered EPO, made by Amgen, which holds the major patents on
EPO, is very expensive. One of the reasons for the high cost is that each
patient requires very high levels of EPO. Gisella Clemons, a scientist at
the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, came up with a protein
binding factor that allowed EPO to bind in the body instead of being
excreted immediately into the urine, thus increasing the uptake of EPO
22by a factor of 10-50 percent.
A patent was issued to Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in
April, 1997. Prior to the patent being issued, the invention was offered
to drug companies, including Amgen. 3 Martha Luehrmann, who handles
technology licensing for the Laboratory, remarked unofficially that
Amgen wasn't interested because it would decrease their lucra-
tive market for EPO. People would need much less EPO per
dose, and Amgen didn't trust that they could make up the short-
18. See id. at 119.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 120.
21. See Email from Martha Luehrman to Jamie Love (April 7, 1998), reprinted in





fall in selling more widely to people who at the present time
can't afford the drug. Other drug companies weren't interested
because they would have to combine the binding protein with
EPO, and all the rights to EPO were in the hands of Amgen. So,
a wonderful advance that could save hundreds of thousands of
children from anemia and death stays on the shelf because the
patent system protects a company that doesn't want to see any
risk to its bottom line.24
Also at issue here is what obligation biotechnology companies have,
if any, to act in the public interest when portions of their innovations
stem from government-funded research programs. 2- Amgen's product,
Epogen, was the result of government-funded research under the
provisions of the Orphan Drug Act 26-1egislation enacted in 1983 to
stimulate the development of drugs for rare diseases that often have a
limited market. The statute provides companies with substantial tax
credits for costs incurred during human drug trials, and gives companies
seven years to exclusively market their product.27 Amgen was awarded
orphan drug status for Epogen, but this may have diminished any
incentive for other companies to go forward with any development on
their own versions of erythropoetin, simply because Amgen had seven
years to build on its patent and gain further exclusivity.2 Indeed, Amgen
sued one of its rivals, Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., to prevent it from
selling its own version of Epogen, and a subsequent federal court
24. Id.
25. For discussions on the scope of patent protection that should be available for bio-
technological innovations, as well as the obligations biotechnology firms should have in
exchange for receiving such protection, see Margo Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later:
Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 469 (2004); Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1676-83 (2003);
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticom-
mons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
26. Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049, 2049-56 (1983) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
27. See id.
28. See Kristi Coale, Nader Takes Biotech Patent to Task, WIRED (Apr. 17, 1998),
available at www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/l 1740.html In 1998, Ralph Nader
and James Love asked then President Clinton to investigate Amgen. Their letters concerned
reports that Amgen had refused to support the development of an invention which would
significantly reduce the average dose of EPO needed by patients, and that other biotechnol-
ogy firms have declined to develop the invention independently because they fear litigation
or loss of intellectual property licensing opportunities from Amgen. The letter observed that
the invention was developed at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL), a national laboratory,
and was supported by grants from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and received U.S.
Patent 5,625,035 in 1997. See Information Policy Notes, Consumer Project on Technology
(Apr. 16, 1998), available at http://www.cptech.org
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ruling effectively blocked Transkaryotic from selling its version of
erythropoietin.2 9
While Amgen's conduct represents a type of suppression, such prac-
tices are not limited to EPO. Recently, the pharmaceutical industry has
received increased scrutiny for suppressive tactics against competing
generic drugs. Some pharmaceutical firms have invoked provisions of
the federal Hatch-Waxman Act30 to delay the entry of generic alterna-
tives into the market. Under this law, brand name drug manufacturers
facing expiration of a patent can block a generic alternative for up to 30
months by alleging patent infringement. When the patents on brand
drugs expire, other firms can make a generic version, which is available
at a lower price. According to the FDA, the generic drugs are just as
effective as the original drugs."
Although the Hatch-Waxman Act is supposed to work this way, this
is not always what happens. Lawyers and lobbyists have found so many
loopholes in the law that some generic drugs are often delayed or never
get to market. For instance, BuSpar is an anti-anxiety drug manufac-
tured by Bristol-Myers Squibb. After the company had had a monopoly
on the drug for years, the patent on BuSpar was set to expire on Novem-
ber 21, 2000, which meant that a cheaper generic version would be
approved and available to consumers the next day.
And then, just hours before its patent on BuSpar expired,
Bristol-Myers Squibb got a new patent on what the drug be-
comes after you swallow it. And the law is written in such a way
that Bristol-Myers was able to then keep the generic drug off the
market, claiming that it would violate its new patent. There was
no innovation involved--only an innovative legal strategy ....
Bristol-Myers was sued by the generic companies, which
claimed that the last-minute patent filed with the FDA should
not keep the generic drug off the market. It took four months for
a court to rule in the generic companies' favor. "During those
four months, Bristol-Myers continued to have the exclusive
right to sell this product on the market, no generic competition,
29. See Anna M. Stolley, Amgen Wins Epogen Patent Suit Against Transkaryotic,
Bloomberg.com (Jan. 19, 2002), available at http://quote.bloomberg.com/fgcgi.cgi?s=
AOmjrVhX2QWlnZW4g&T=marketsquote99_news.
30. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman
Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2000).
31. See Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study (July 2002),
available at http:/www.ftc.govlosl2002/O7/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
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and ... during those four months, they made approximately
$200 million."
32
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission ruled that Schering-
Plough Corporation (Schering), and potential generic competitors Up-
sher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. (Upsher) and American Home Products
(AHP), entered into illegal agreements in 1997 and 1998 to delay the
entry of lower-cost generic competition for Schering's prescription drug
K-Dur 20, which is used to treat people with low potassium.33 According
to the FTC, Schering and its potential generic competitors, Upsher and
AHP, settled patent litigation with terms that included unconditional
payments by Schering in return for agreements to defer introduction of
the generic products.34 These settlement agreements, involving "reverse"
payments from the patentee to the alleged infringer, result in the elimi-
nation of a competitor's product from the market and thereby result in
less competition than would likely have occurred absent the payment.
The FTC observed that, without "proof of other offsetting considera-
tions, it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for the payment was
an agreement by the generic to defer market entry beyond the date that
represents an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise."36
C. Alternative Fuel Vehicles
Electric engines were around at the inception of the automobile, but
the internal combustion engine clearly won out as the preferred power
system because of its lower cost and higher performance levels.37 Today,
32. Bitter Medicine, ABC News (May 29, 2002), available at http://abcnews.go.com/
onair/ABCNEWSSpecials/pharmaceuticals_020529_pjrfeature.html
33. In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., et al., Docket No. 9297 (FTC Dec. 18,
2003), appeal docketed, No. 04-10688-AA (11th Cir. filed Feb. 13, 2004), available at
www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf
34. See id. at 86-87.
35. As of January 7, 2004, certain categories of agreements between brand-name and
generic pharmaceutical companies now must be filed with the FTC and the DOJ. See Federal
Trade Commission Pharmaceutical Agreement Notification Filing Requirements,
www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/01/fyiO4O3.htm For further discussion of the anticompetitive effects
of reverse payment settlements, see Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits
to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 408 (2003).
36. In re Schering-Plough Corp. at 26. See also Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (1 1th Cir. 2003); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation, 261 F.Supp. 2d 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation,
262 F. Supp. 2d 17 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
37. For comprehensive discussion of technological changes in the car industry, see
generally WILLIAM J. ABERNATHY, THE PRODUCTIVITY DILEMMA: ROADBLOCK TO INNOVA-
TION IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (1978).
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as oil supplies dwindle, as roadways become increasingly congested,
and as air quality deteriorates, contributing to the so-called greenhouse
effect, there is increasing pressure to address these problems before they
escalate. A number of states, most prominently California, have re-
sponded by encouraging conservation, regulating emission levels, and
mandating the greater production and sale of alternative fuel vehicles.
However, according to the news media, the technology for alterna-
tive vehicles was neither available nor affordable." While it is true that
the performance of alternative vehicles continues to lag behind that of
conventional automobiles, there is a long history of inventions that have
been suppressed. There is evidence that several of these inventions could
have yielded higher fuel performance and emitted much lower levels of
pollutants. For example, in 1936, a number of prominent automotive
industry observers were convinced that cars could attain more than 200
miles per gallon with the use of inventor Charles Pogue's carburetor.
Speeds on tests of this device ranged from 2-70 m.p.h.39 In the 1970s,
Paul Pantone's carburetor, incorporating an internal refinery, used a
process called thermal resonant cracking. His vehicle ran on crude oil
and other unrefined fuels and yielded practically no pollution. 4 Tom
Ogle's automotive system did not employ a carburetor, but used a series
of hoses that fed a mixture of gas vapors and air directly into the engine.
In May 1977, Ogle's Ford Galaxie reportedly averaged 100 miles per
gallon at 55 miles per hour.4' Finally, in the late 1960s and early 70s,
there was an antitrust suit brought against the American automobile
manufacturers, alleging that they had conspired to acquire and delay the
introduction of patented air pollution control equipment. This case never
went to trial and was settled in 1973. 42
38. See Selling Fuel Cells, THE ECONOMIST (May 25, 1996), at 86-87. See also
Spenser Michels, All Charged Up, The Newshour with Jim Lehrer (Sept 9, 1996); Spenser
Michels, Paying at the Plug, The Newshour with Jim Lehrer (Aug. 20, 1997); Patent System
Promotes Suppression of Technology: David Carlson Interviewed by Dan Charles, Morning
Edition (May 23, 1993), Transcript #1351.
39. See Herb C. Braund, Sensational Performance Seen in Pogue Carburetor Tests,
CANADIAN AUTOMOTIVE AUTOMOTIVE TRADE 37-38 (May 1936), reprinted in J. BRUCE
McBURNEY, THE SECRET SUPER HIGH MILEAGE REPORT (1996). McBurney and others con-
tinue to draw attention to these neglected and apparently suppressed automotive innovations.
See Fred A. Ranz, Letter to the Editor: The Culprit: Carburetion, Bus. WK., at 5 (Apr. 7,
1973); see also JONATHAN EISEN SUPPRESSED INVENTIONS & OTHER DISCOVERIES
(1999)(discussing Charles Pogue).
40. See Paul Pantone and Other Links, available at www.inett.com/himac.
41. Gregory Jones, The Tom Ogle Story, available at www.inett.com/himac/
default.html See also John Doussard, 200 Miles On Two Gallons of Gas, THE EL PASO TIMES
(May 1, 1977).
42. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 367 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal 1973).
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As a result of decades of commitment to improve air quality and to
"force" development of automotive and fuel technologies, alternative
vehicles are coming of age. Nonetheless, it is disturbing that other prac-
tical and economical solutions-including early improvements to the
internal combustion engine- have been stymied and never reached the
mainstream market.
D. Future Impact
These few examples show us that suppression is not specific to a
particular technology domain. We have described instances of suppres-
sion in industries as diverse as pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and
automobile manufacturing, and there is reason to believe that products
ranging from artificial caviar 43 to photovoltaics 4 may have also been
shelved. Clearly, technology suppression is alive and well. What then,
we might ask, is the impact of the information age on innovation and
suppression? What are the implications if the legal system continues to
turn a blind eye to the existence and effects of suppression? Since
the 1980s, the courts have expanded the scope of subject matter that can
be patented. For example, it is now possible to patent business meth-
ods,software programs and designs, gene sequences, and processes of
genetic engineering."5 Many of these newly patentable inventions are
bound up with the public interest and larger global and ethical issues.
43. Romanoff Caviar Company developed a synthetic caviar as a "defensive marketing
weapon" against a similar product developed in the Soviet Union. Romanoff's product would
have sold for one-fourth the price of real, top-grade caviar, and apparently was never mar-
keted because Romanoff did not want to compete with itself in the sale of real caviar in the
small U.S.market. See Ersatz Caviar, Bus. WK., June 28, 1976, at 51.
44. Richard Fellmuth has outlined the possibility of the suppression of photovoltaic
technology, which uses solar energy to generate electricity. Fellmuth warns that "oil-industry
attempts to delay solar energy are to be expected" since "a large-scale shift to this resource is
a real threat to continued profits from the oil-industry capital investment." See Fellmuth,
supra note 5, at 201. See also Henry Etzkowitz, Solar Versus Nuclear Energy: Autonomous
or Dependent Technology?, 31 SOCIAL PROBS. 417 (1984).
45. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the
Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2083-84 (2000)("Once confined to traditional fields
of applied technology such as mechanics and chemicals, the patent system has moved into
agriculture, medical procedures, computer software, and business methods.") (footnotes
omitted).
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FIGURE I
KEY EVENTS RELATED TO ALTERNATIVE VEHICLES
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The proliferation of patents granted and the expansion of patentable
subject matter have increased opportunities for suppression of technolo-
gies, thus raising public interest concerns. We believe the effects of
suppression are more serious and far reaching in an information age and
global economy. A cure for a rare disease, a genetically engineered
treatment for crop infestation, or a new business method to serve cus-
tomers and suppliers all represent innovations that, if suppressed, would
have dire consequences for global food supplies, trade and commerce,
and national and international security. There is enormous risk when
such inventions, privately owned and protected by a patent, can be held
hostage or held back from the marketplace.
IV. DEFINING SUPPRESSION
To what extent is it possible to see tell-tale signs of suppression?
Some of the fingerprints may include: refusals to license, creation of
patent pools and patent "thickets," takeovers of competitors, and the
filing of baseless suits for patent infringement. These are not necessarily
predictors of suppression, but they often coexist along with nonused
patents. Inventions may be suppressed as a result of sound business
judgment' or for anticompetitive reasons-to gain a monopoly, fix
prices, or otherwise restrain trade. In this paper, we are concerned with
patented technologies that have been suppressed by the owner or licen-
see in order to stifle competition.47
We focus specifically on the intentional nonuse and nondiffusion of
patented technologies. All nonuse is intentional, but when it is
combined with a refusal to license for anticompetitive reasons, the result
is suppression. How does this occur? Suppression may result from a
"fencing" patent "on an improvement to the product of a competitor and
held in nonuse to restrict him to an inferior technology or to more
effectively compete when the basic patent expires.4 8 Suppression may
also result from obtaining patents on close substitutes, which achieve
46. For instance, a patent owner may conclude that the invention is not workable or
marketable for any number of reasons: economic conditions have changed, consumer de-
mand has abated, production costs are too high, or the invention has been superseded by
other technological developments.
47. Inventions can also be legitimately maintained as trade secrets. A trade secret is
any information that has competitive value due to not being generally known. See Donald S.
Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3C[1]
(1992).
48. George E. Frost, Legal Incidents of Non-Use of Patented Inventions Reconsidered,
14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 276 (1946).
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the same result as an existing innovation, thereby "blocking"
competitors from development.'9 Exclusive license agreements may also
lead to suppression. 50
The study of technology suppression is particularly challenging be-
cause management science and strategic R&D literature do not readily
acknowledge its existence. Moreover, the courts have been unwilling to
view patent suppression as unlawful. Two additional factors complicate
the understanding and resolution of technology suppression: (1) a char-
acterization of patents as a form of private property rather than a
publicly-granted privilege, and (2) a conceptual incompatibility between
the purposes behind intellectual property and antitrust law.
A. Private Property vs. Public Privilege
Patents are thought to serve three purposes: to promote invention, to
encourage development and commercialization of inventions, and to
encourage inventors to disclose their inventions." Today, patents are
considered to be another form of property.5 ' Historically, however, a pat-
ent was a privilege granted by the Crown, in the form of a temporary
monopoly given to an inventor who promised to put the invention to
use.53 In 1623, the Statute of Monopolies forbade all grants of exclusive
privilege by the Crown and the power shifted to Parliament to grant pat-
ents to inventors for a period of fourteen years.4 In the United States,
the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of nonuse of a patented
technology in the case of Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper
Bag Co. ,5 an action to enjoin infringement of a patent on a machine for
manufacturing paper bags. The defendant argued that an injunction
would be inequitable since the plaintiff was not using its patent. In al-
lowing the injunction against the defendant's infringing use, the
Supreme Court explained:
49. See Wesley M. Cohen, et al., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APPRO-
PRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) 21-24
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W7552 (2000).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 175-98.
51. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 440 (2d ed. 1980).
52. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, has stated that intellectual property
is comparable to any other form of property. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT,
ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE-VOLUME I, at 215 (1998) [hereinafter FTC Staff Report]. See also 35 U.S.C.
§ 261 (1988)("[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property").
53. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 47, at 2B n.1.
54. See id. at § 2B[I] n.2.
55. 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
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[C]an it be said, as a matter of law, that a nonuse was unreason-
able which had for its motive the saving of expense that would
have been involved by changing the equipment of a factory from
one set of machines to another? And even if the old machines
could have been altered, the expense would have been consider-
able. As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from
the use of the new patent, we answer that such exclusion may be
said to have been the very essence of the right conferred by the
patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or
not use it, without question of motive.56
This line of reasoning was later reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
Special Equipment Co. v. Coe.57 In that case, the inventor of a machine
for canning pears sued to compel the Patent Office to issue a patent for a
subcombination of elements of the machine. The inventor sought to
suppress the subcombination in order to prevent competitors from de-
veloping a similar technology. The majority of the members of the
Court found that no issue of suppression existed; however, Justice
Douglas in the dissent argued against the notion that patents should be
treated as private property:
It is a mistake therefore to conceive of a patent as but another
form of private property. The patent is a privilege "conditioned
by a public purpose."... [Continental Paper Bag] subordinated
the public purpose of the grant to the self-interest of the pat-
entee. The result is that suppression of patents has become
commonplace. Patents are multiplied to protect an economic
barony or empire, not to put new discoveries to use for the
common good. "It is common practice to make an invention and
to secure a patent to block off a competitor's progress.'' 8
Once again, in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,59 the Supreme
Court rejected a lower court decision that would have effectively forced
a patent holder to license its patent. The Court rejected the argument
that a patent was a public privilege that might impose a duty to use the
technology: "A patent owner is not in the position of quasi-trustee for
the public or under any obligation to see that the public acquires the free
right to use the invention. He has no obligation either to use it or to
56. Id. at 429.
57. 324 U.S. 370 (1945).
58. Id. at 747 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
59. 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
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grant its use to others."6 This position was apparently embraced by
Congress in enacting section 271(d)(4) of the Patent Act, which states:
"No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement ... shall
be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse ... by reason of having...
refused to license or use any rights to the patent ... ,6,
Debates on the consequences of the recent patenting "frenzy" have
not resulted in clear answers about whether new policies on the scope of
patent protection will stifle or spur innovation. 62 Heller and Eisenberg
believe that strong and broad patent protection will stymie innovation,
and they relate this problem to the tragedy of the anti-commons:
By conferring monopolies in discoveries, patents necessarily in-
crease prices and restrict use-a cost society pays to motivate
invention and disclosure. The tragedy of the anti-commons re-
fers to the more complex obstacles that arise when a user needs
access to multiple patented inputs to create a single useful prod-
uct. Each upstream patent allows its owner to set up another
tollbooth on the road to product development, adding to the cost
63and slowing the pace of downstream.., innovation.
Similarly, Ziedonis and Hall warn that the rush to acquire patent
portfolios might slow the generation of new ideas.6' While the courts
have made a choice to treat patents as private property, this choice may
be problematic with respect to suppression and nonuse. For example,
where federal funds have been used to develop an innovation, especially
in the area of critical technologies, a public investment has been made.65
60. Id. at 432-33 (2000).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2000).
62. See, e.g., Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, Discovering New Value in Intellectual
Property, HARv. Bus. REV. 54 (2000); Ron Wilson, The Patent System Has Just Gone MAD,
ELEC. ENG'G. TIMES (Jan. 9, 1999), available at http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?
articlelD=18300855; Mark Gemein, Jay Walker, Patent Mania, SALON (Sept. 8, 1999),
available at http://www.salonmagazine.comtech/feature/1999/08/27/priceleine/index.html;
J. William Gurley, Patent Here, Patent There, Patent, Patent Everywhere, CNETNews (Jun.
14, 1999), available at http://www.CNETNews.com.
63. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998), available at http://
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698.
64. See Rosemarie H. Ziedonis & Bronwyn H. Hall, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J.
ECON. 101 (2001).
65. The government retains march-in rights to innovations that are developed at fed-
eral R&D facilities and with federal funding under the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-14 (2000), and the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212,
301-307 (2001). Sometimes, the government itself suppresses technology on the basis of
public interest. For instance, the Army Judge Advocate General's office seizes control of
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Nevertheless, the classification of patents as a form of private property,
rather than as a publicly-granted privilege, has had important implica-
tions for the problem of technology suppression.
B. Purposes of Patent and Antitrust Law
Legal treatment of technology suppression has very often arisen in
the context of patent nonuse or misuse. Traditionally, the courts have
held that intentional nonuse of patented technology by its owner or li-
censee is neither a violation of the antitrust laws nor a misuse of the
patent.' They have done so on the grounds that it is the option of the
patent holder to use or not use the patent, irrespective of motive, as is
the case with any other form of private property. 67 This justification also
highlights the sometimes conflicting purposes underlying antitrust law
and the patent law.
The traditional view was that there is longstanding conceptual in-
compatibility between antitrust law, which is designed to preserve
competition and prevent monopolies, and patent law, which grant a
"monopoly" to the patent owner. 68 Patents serve as an incentive to invent
by promising inventors a twenty year monopoly based on a grant of ex-
clusive property rights, whereas antitrust law prohibits monopolies
because they are economically inefficient and not in the public interest.
69
The current view is that patents do not automatically confer monopoly
power and that the patent and antitrust laws are "complementary, as both
are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry, and competition."7°
While there are persuasive economic reasons to accept this perspective,
it further inhibits the courts from using antitrust law to address technol-
ogy suppression through patent nonuse.
private inventions that fall into certain pre-determined categories under the Invention Secrecy
Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188. The Defense and Justice Departments have selected a series of
subject categories that comprise sensitive military functions, which are contained in the Pat-
ent Security Category Review List, and approximately 3 percent of all patent applications fall
into these categories and are reviewed by the military and the Justice Department. See Sabing
H. Lee, Protecting the Inventor Under the Peacetime Provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act,
12 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 345 (1997).
66. See infra notes 120-38 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
68. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981)("While the
antitrust laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the
inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his
patented art ... [thus] the patent and antitrust laws necessarily clash ").
69. For extended discussions of the patent and antitrust law interface, see Sheila F.
Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners, 28 AIPLA
Q. J. 1 (2000); Norman F. Rosen, Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Pendulum, 62 ANTI-
TRUST L. J. 669 (1994); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984).
70. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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V. CONTEXT AND CONDITIONS FOR SUPPRESSION
We set out to identify and better understand the possible contribu-
tors to technology suppression. We considered a set of variables - the
nature of the market, the nature of the innovation, and related secondary
concerns, including the roles of labor and standardization. All of these
factors appeared to be relevant to our investigation. Our goal was to dis-
cern patterns that allowed us to predict when suppression was likely to
occur. If we could identify such patterns, we could then consider meas-
ures that would anticipate and discourage technology suppression. Each
of these factors is addressed in turn.
A. Nature of the Market
While technology suppression is not exclusively tied to any one
condition, we theorized that heavily concentrated markets might be as-
sociated with suppression. In a competitive marketplace, a firm is likely
to innovate, but when one firm dominates the market and its revenue
stream is constant, that firm is likely to choose to preserve the status
quo. 7' This may also be true in oligopolistic markets, where leading
firms may collude on what will and will not change.72 We believe that a
firm is most likely to suppress a patented technology in order (1) to pre-
vent a potential competitor from entering its market, (2) to prevent a
current competitor from commercializing the technology or developing
a close substitute, or (3) to protect its current position in an upstream or
downstream market that would be affected by the patent.
71. See Scherer, supra note 51, at 428.





To prevent potential competitor from entering its
market
Prevent competitor from commercializing
technology or developing a substitute
Protect current position in an upstream or SUPPRESSION
downstream market
Ironically, in each instance, the exclusive rights of the patent are
used to suppress the invention rather than to bring it to market. This
seems at odds with the argument that one of the primary purposes of
patents is to stimulate innovation. "If a patent has value in the market-
place, the rational patentee will generally make direct use of it, license
it, or both,, 73 or, as the old adage goes, "If a man can write a better book,
preach a better sermon, or make a better mousetrap than his neighbor,
though he builds his house in the woods, the world will make a beaten
path to his door.' 74 Empirical evidence suggests however, that in many
industries, patents may not provide the strongest incentive for innova-
tion, and that a majority of industries do not consider patents to be very
important assets. 75 This may be due to economies and diseconomies of
scale:
[S]mall firms may be adequate for handling minor innovations,
but other innovations may be so large that only a large firm can
mass the needed funds, equipment, talent, and sustained effort.
Also, the risk may be so high that only secure dominant firms
can take the chance.... [I]nnovation is often speeded when
several firms race to invent or innovate first. The resulting gain
73. Phillip Areeda & Lawrence Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis 441 (4th ed. 1988).
74. Ralph Waldo Emerson, in The Columbia World of Quotations (1996), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/66/67/19467.html.
75. FTC Staff Report at 4. "The evidence suggests that both intellectual property pro-
tection and competition are important to spur innovation. Business testimony asserted the
importance of intellectual property protection to encourage initial innovation, but some noted
that, if intellectual property protection is overbroad, it may stifle follow-on innovation. Busi-
ness testimony also stressed the significance of competition as a force motivating innovation,
a principle that economics so far neither conclusively confirms nor rejects."
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in competitive speed may offset any economies of scale in inno-
vation that might exist.76
Suppression is less likely to occur when there is such a race. A race is
likely to arise when there is technology forcing caused by government
mandate or subsidy, a crisis situation (health, environmental, or military),
high consumer demand, or the sudden appearance of an innovation that
spurs others to copy." Sometimes, new technologies can be imitated so
quickly that the inventor cannot recover sufficient profit to justify the cost
of development. "Free riders" may appropriate the benefits of the inven-
tion by imitating it and reaping the profits. "[I]nnovators need a period of
monopoly, it is claimed, so they can reap enough gains to justify their
costs before the free riders ... capture the rest."78 However, dominant
firms have little to gain by introducing new inventions immediately,
unless their competitors also do so.7 A dominant firms gains less from
innovating than does a competitive firm, because the dominant firm "re-
places itself' when it innovates.0
If the new technology requires replacing the existing plant and
equipment with costly new tooling and infrastructure, there are substan-
tial sunk costs involved in adopting the new technology.8I As the
Supreme Court in the Continental Paper Bag case pointed out, "[A
p]atentee may not find it profitable to scrap existing machinery in order
to adopt a new production process or eliminate a product line that would
be superseded by the new product.' 82 The firm may patent and then sup-
press the new technology to avoid competition until it has to replace its
existing plant and equipment at a later date. 3 Likewise, a firm may sup-
press an innovation until it has exhausted the revenue stream from a
"cash cow."'H By contrast, if a new competitor could use the patented
76. WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 145
(1990).
77. "R&D competition can be likened to a race for a patent. In this situation, each firm
... accelerate[s] its research program at the cost of incurring additional expenses." Tirole,
supra note 80, at 394.
78. See id. at 145-46.
79. See Scherer, supra note 51, at 428.
80. See Jean Tirole, Research and Development and the Adoption of New Technolo-
gies, in THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 392 (1988).
81. Sunk costs are those capital investments that a new firm must bear to gain entry
into a market. See William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry
Barriers, and Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q. J. ECON. 405, 406-07 (1981).
82. Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 73, at 441.
83. See Richard J. Gilbert & David M. G. Newberry, Preemptive Patenting and the
Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. EON. REV. 514, 518 (1982)
84. The macro-effects of such corporate decisions have been discussed by historians
of American technology such as David Noble. See David F Noble, The Corporation as In-
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technology, it could invest in the required infrastructure or new product
development upfront, without the need to deal with any sunk costs.
"Of course, the patentee could always license the patent to the new
entrant; however, innovation is associated with strong first-mover ad-
vantages, so the first company to manufacture and to sell a product is
likely to maintain a dominant position even after the patent expires and
after further inventions supersede the original one. 5 Thus, licensing to
competitors may not be an attractive option for many patentees.' 86 Sunk
costs are also important when the patentee is in an upstream or down-
stream market that would be affected by the patent.
Consider the rumor that Exxon purchased and buried the design
for the "momentum" engine, which would tremendously increase
automobile engine efficiency (and therefore tremendously de-
crease the demand for gasoline). It could produce and sell the
momentum engine, using the revenues from those sales to offset
its loss in gasoline revenues. However, Exxon is not in the engine
business and is likely to be less efficient at that business than it is
at refining and selling gasoline. Its profit-maximizing course may
therefore be to conceal the invention, so that no one else can use
it, and to continue to sell gasoline. 7
Another variation on related markets concerns "network effects."
The more a firm sells of a particular product or service, the more
consumers desire it, because the increasing adoption of the product or
service increases its value to the next consumer. Once a network gets a
sufficiently large number of consumers, it becomes almost impossible
for a new entrant, without access to the network, to successfully
ventor: Patent-Law Reform and Patent Monopoly, in AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECH-
NOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM 84 (1977) (recording the emergence of
corporate control of the patent system that made possible the exploitation and suppression of
innovations).
85. See Tirole, supra note 80, at 393.
86. See ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNO-
LOGICAL AGE 288 (1996).
87. Id.
88. The classic example is the telephone: the more people on a given network, the
more value the network has to potential users, making it easier to get the next customer, and
so on (Klein, 2000). "[N]etworks can be real or virtual. Real networks include communica-
tions and transportation networks, such as telephone, facsimile, computer, railroad, or
electricity networks. Virtual networks are collections of users who have adopted compatible
technology" (e.g., users of MacIntosh computers, Sega video game machines, or VHS video
players). Carl Shapiro, Antitrust/Intellectual Property Claims in High Technology Markets,
Antitrust in Network Industries, Address to the American Law Institute and American
Bar Association (Jan. 25, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
shapir.mar.txt.
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challenge its dominance.' 9 Thus, alternative technologies may be
shelved due to the predominance of an existing network.
B. Nature of the Innovation
We also set out to investigate whether the nature of the innovation
might be a predictor for technology suppression. Much controversy sur-
rounds the nature of innovations and whether they are radical or
routine. 90 Professors Abernathy and Clark argue that "the significance of
innovation for competition depends on . . . 'transilience'-that is, its
capacity to influence the firm's existing resources, skills and knowl-
edge."9' They argue that "the particular combination or pattern of
technology and market transilience ... is important in determining
competitive impact."92 Abernathy and Clark depict these effects by cre-
ating a transilience map made up of four quadrants, each representing a
different kind of innovation. These quadrants are: architectural, niche,
regular and revolutionary, which "are closely linked to patterns of indus-
try development, and ... represent phases of innovative development." 93
The architectural quadrant includes new technology that "departs
from established systems of production and in turn opens up new link-
ages to markets and users. 94 Technology in the niche quadrant opens
new market opportunities through the use of existing technology but
"here the effect on production and technical systems is to conserve and
strengthen established designs." 95 Regular innovations are "often almost
invisible, yet can have a dramatic cumulative effect on product cost and
performance ... [involving] change that builds on established technical
and production competence and that is applied to existing markets and
customers. 96 A revolutionary innovation "disrupts and renders estab-
lished technical and production competence obsolete, yet is applied to
existing markets and customers. 97
89. See Joel Klein, Rethinking Antitrust Policies for the New Economy, Speech at the
Haas/Berkeley New Economy Forum, Haas School of Business, University of California at
Berkeley (May 9, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/4707.htm
90. See Tornatzky & Fleischer, supra note 3, at 18-20.
91. William J. Abernathy & Kim B. Clark, Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative
Destruction 14 RES. POL'Y 3, 5 (1985).
92. Id. at 7.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 10.








As we have suggested, in exploring technology suppression and its
circumstances, we considered whether certain types of innovation might
be more likely to be suppressed. Intuitively, it seemed to us that revolu-
tionary or architectural technologies (radical innovations) were more
likely candidates for suppression. This would corroborate our findings on
the nature of the market, and on how market dominance in conjunction
with sunk costs might discourage innovation. In considering the full range
of legal cases and historical examples available to us-approximately
forty instances-we were unable to discern any pattern with respect to the
nature of the innovation. In other words, to our surprise, we identified ex-
amples of all types of technology having been suppressed-architectural,
niche, regular, and revolutionary.
We considered whether Shepherd's distinctions between innovation
and imitation would be more helpful: "Invention is the creation of a new
idea .... Innovation converts the idea to practical use ... Imitation then
follows as the innovation is copied by others. 'g The concept of imitation
is related to the development of close substitutes by free riders. As we
have already seen, a patent owner may delay introducing a product in
order to prevent competition by an imitator until the patent owner is
ready to invest in retooling.
Finally, in addition to the nature of the market and the innovation,
we considered whether research and development strategy contributed
to suppression. Competitive pressures sometimes influence companies
to match one another in R&D activities, though dominant or monopolis-
tic firms may not be affected by this pressure. Tornatzky observes that
"industry concentration per se does not have much influence on R&D
98. Shepherd, supra note 76, at 142.
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strategy"; 99 however, we have seen that the nature of the market, includ-
ing industry concentration, may encourage suppression. In addition,
R&D strategy may be guided by government technology policy. We be-
lieve that government-sanctioned joint ventures and cooperative
activities facilitate development and commercialization, thus making
suppression less likely.'I°
C. Additional Conditions
Several additional factors are noteworthy, including the role of labor
and standardization.
1. Role of Labor in Technology Suppression
In the same way that firms may be reluctant to introduce new tech-
nologies that will displace existing plant and equipment, they may
hesitate to introduce new technologies that may displace workers, espe-
cially if the workforce is unionized and management fears strikes and
other backlash. "Change in technology may mean obsolescence in labor
as well as in machines, and therefore workers have opposed inventions
that threaten their jobs."'0 ' This quandary is not new. For instance, in
Europe, from 1400 to 1700, guilds prohibited the use of machines, such
as pin head pressing machines, looms, and button weaving machines in
order to fence out innovation and protect their constituents.'02 "Workers
can hardly be expected to be receptive to technological changes in the
specific fields in which they are employed, when they are cognizant that
their skills will be rendered worthless and their status and very liveli-
hood imperiled by the resultant unemployment."'0 3
99. See Tornatzky & Fleischer, supra note 3, at 91.
100. See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
101. Vaughan, 1956, p. 22.
102. See Stem, supra note 8, at 14.
103. Id. In 1996, the European Commission recognized such concerns in its Green
Paper on the information society. The paper acknowledged that while the adoption and wide-
spread use of information and communication technologies offer great opportunity for the
creation of wealth and increased standards of living, there are many concerns still to be reck-
oned with about the impact of the information society on the quality of life. Two key
questions were framed: (1) Will these technologies not destroy more jobs than they create
and will people be able to adapt to the changes in the way they work? (2) Will the complex-
ity and the cost of the new technologies not widen the gaps between industrialized and less
developed areas, between the young and the old, between those in the know and those who
are not? See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE GENERAL V, EMPLOYMENT, INDUSTRIAL




Standards identify a specific technology for adoption by all firms
and are usually mandated by government or agreed upon by private in-
dustry committees in order to ensure compatibility. °' The drivers for
standardization are to avoid excess inertia and to reduce user search and
coordination costs.' 5 A firm that controls a technology that becomes
established as a standard can have an extremely profitable market posi-
tion, what Ferguson and Morris call an "architectural 
franchise."' 6
Dominant firms in the market may set de facto standards. Standards
may eliminate or discourage competition of a more radical nature: an
"agreed upon standard may eliminate competition between technologies
and channel it into other forms of competition such as price, service and
product features."'07
In addition to suppressing competition, firms participating in stan-
dards development may be tempted to collude to set a standard, or to
keep an existing standard in place to resist change or innovation. 0 8 A
standard in place can become an ingredient in sunk costs and can dis-
courage future innovation in products and, consequently, the evolution
of existing standards. The cost of switching from one technology to an-
other may result in "lock-in" to a specific technology since consumers
will be unwilling to switch to another standard unless the new standard
offers significant improved functionality. °9
VI. LEGAL CASES & RESEARCH: TACTICS
In reviewing over forty cases and histories concerning technology
suppression, we identified at least five categories of tactics by which
innovations have been shelved or delayed.
104. See David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property: An Economic Approach,
19 DAYTON L. REV. 1109, 1119-21 (1994).
105. See id. at 1121-24.
106. See CHARLES FERGUSON & CHARLES MORRIS, COMPUTER WARS: How THE WEST
CAN WIN IN A POST-IBM WORLD, 131 (1993).
107. Stanley M. Besen, & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and
Tactics Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 119-20 (1994); see also Joseph Farrell,
Standardization and Intellectual Property,30 JURIMETRICS 35 (1989).
108. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETI-
TION AND ITS PRACTICE 178-79 (West 2d ed. 1999).
109. See Patrick D. Curran, Standard-Setting Organization: Patents, Price Fixing, and
Per Se Illegality, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 983, 990 n.26 (2003).
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TABLE I
TACTICS OF TECHNOLOGY SUPPRESSION
TACTIC DEFINITION
baseless litigation and threats
Sham Litigation to sue made with the intent to
suppress competition
intentional refusal to use or
license a patent
patent is exploited or
extended for anticompetitive
Patent Abuse purposes, including patent
consolidation, creation of
patent thickets, and patent
pooling
one firm acquires another in
Horizontal Takeovers & order to suppress the
Acquisitions development of a competing
innovation
patentee grants an exclusive
license to a firm that
expresses a desire to develop
Exclusive Licensing the innovation; the firm then




Sham litigation, involving predatory patent infringement suits or
threats of suits, may lead a competitor to withhold an innovation when it
cannot afford to defend the case. Such litigation and threats are made in
bad faith, with the intent to suppress the patented invention and compe-
tition." ' Larger firms have an advantage in developing and promoting
new innovations and an ability to intimidate smaller firms through legal
challenges to the validity of their patents. Smaller firms may have no
choice but to settle."' Sham litigation can effectively dampen competi-
tion or create a sense of disruption and trepidation, and misuse of the
courts and the regulatory process can be an effective way to stifle com-
petition. "2
110. See Vaughan, supra note 4, at 265, 270-77.
111. See Scherer, supra note 51, at 449-450.
112. See Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 73, at 268-70.
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Such was the case in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, a in
which it was alleged that Hartford-Empire and several other companies
entered into agreements to monopolize the glass container manufactur-
ing industry, and to restrain trade in violation of the antitrust 
laws.1 '
Hartford-Empire obtained numerous and sometimes competing patents,
which it suppressed through various means, including threats of litiga-
tion against competitors. In one instance, Hartford-Empire pursued and
won an infringement suit on a patent that it had fraudulently obtained.
Hartford-Empire bullied small competitors into granting it exclusive
patent licenses under threat of lawsuits, which a federal district court
condemned as "litigation expensive beyond the dreams of the average
man.,"'5 On appeal, the Supreme Court found that Hartford-Empire
unlawfully conspired, monopolized, and attempted to acquire and main-
tain monopolies of patents in the manufacture and distribution of glass-
making machinery and the sale of glass products."6
Under current antitrust law, challenging sham litigation remains
very difficult. For a lawsuit to be adjudged a sham, it "must be objec-
tively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically
expect success on the merits."' 17 In addition, the court must decide that
"the baseless suit is intended to be an anticompetitive weapon, directly
interfering with the business of the competitor."8 This standard of proof
is almost impossible to meet.
B. Patent Nonuse
Patent nonuse involves the intentional refusal to use or license a
patent."9 The patentee attempts to "block" competitors from using that
technology or developing a close substitute.' 20 "Suppression of patented
inventions ... may result from a 'fencing' patent secured on an im-
provement to the product of a competitor and held in nonuse to restrict
him to an inferior technology."'' 2' In addition, an exclusive licensing
agreement may lead to nonuse when the licensee refuses to work the
113. 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
114. See id. at 400.
115. United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F Supp. 541, 618 (N.D. Ohio 1942).
116. See 323 U.S. at 431-32.
117. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc., v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
60-61 (1993).
118. FTC Staff Report at 220-221.
119. See Dunford, supra note 5, at 513.
120. The matter of what constitutes a close substitute is not always clear; for instance,
either a subcombination (reconfiguration) or an incremental innovation (extension) may
qualify as a substitute. See Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 73, at 561-64.
121. See Frost, supra note 48, at 276.
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invention. 22 Two documented instances of suppression involving patent
nonuse concern telecommunications inventions developed by AT&T in
the early part of the twentieth century. We briefly discuss both of these
inventions: first, magnetic recording devices, and then wireless teleph-
ony.
1. AT&T and Magnetic Recording
In 1930, AT&T's Bell Laboratories decided to fund research in
magnetic recording based upon its involvement in sound recording re-
search. At this time, Bell Laboratories had developed the "Vitaphone,"
which produced sound for motion pictures.'23 In an effort to entice
AT&T to complete further work on magnetic recording, many outside
firms, including the Dictaphone Corporation, pressured Bell to produce
magnetic recording devices. At AT&T, Clarence Hickman's pioneering
research led to a shift from phonograph-based technology to magnetic
recording. ' 24 In 1934, prior to his departure from the magnetic recording
project team, he assembled a prototype of a telephone answering ma-
chine that was tested successfully in-house and in limited field tests.'25
Nevertheless, AT&T's management decided to abandon commercial
development of magnetic recording "for ideological reasons stemming
from the corporate culture of the Bell system .... Management feared
that availability of recording devices would make customers less willing
to use the telephone system and so undermine the concept of universal
service."' 26 Corporate memoranda document the concern that commer-
cial negotiations by telephone would be inhibited because they were
recorded, and that individuals would not use the telephone if they in-
tended to discuss illegal and immoral issues. 27 Since telephone users
were already concerned about privacy, because wiretapping was legal at
this time, AT&T believed that the possibility of recording would in-
crease their apprehensions. 21
Moreover, AT&T desired to control the nature of the telephone system
and to prevent attachment of devices to its circuits that were outside its
control.29 It may have been seeking to extend its monopoly into radio,
122. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
123. See Mark Clark, Suppressing Innovation: Bell Laboratories and Magnetic Re-
cording, 34 TECH. & CULTURE 516, 520-24 (1993).
124. See id. at 524-25.
125. See id. at 529-30.
126. Id. at 533-534.
127. See id. at 534.
128. See id. at 534-35.
129. See id. at 534-37.
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film, and television, but was aware that such extensions would bring
increased antitrust scrutiny about venturing into new markets.'30 Mag-
netic recording devices finally emerged when the U.S government
funded Armour Research Foundation and Brush Development Company
to develop and supply magnetic recorders to the military during World
War II. This later stimulated post-war consumer demand and resulted in
markets for AT&T's competitors.'
2. AT&T and Wireless Telephony
From the beginning, AT&T was aggressive about occupying the
field of telephone technology by patenting around its inventions and
examining new patents by others with an eye toward acquiring these
patents or enforcing its own patents. 32 In 1909, AT&T engineer John
Carty argued for intensive research into wireless technology because of
the potential threat of radio.'33 He was concerned that radio broadcasting
might refine sound transmission technology and then enter AT&T's
market. In response, AT&T organized a research effort aimed at produc-
ing a quality system of wireless telephony transmission and reception as
a defensive measure. 34 Sensitivity about market intrusions and overlap-
ping markets persisted. In 1927, General Electric (GE) commercial
manager, Otterson, wrote the "Four Square Memorandum" in which he
analyzed the role played by scientific developments in fields closest to
telephony. 33 The memo discussed the conflicts of interest between
AT&T on the one hand, and RCA, GE, Western Union, and International
Telephone & Telegraph on the other. The various interests represented
were the power and light group, radio group, telegraph group, and for-
eign telephone service.
36
130. See id. at 536.
131. See id. at 537-38.
132. A 1892 annual report written by the patent attorney for American Bell Telephone
Co. describes the effects of suing competitors for patent infringement:
[I]t appears to me that the policy of bringing suit for infringement on apparatus
patents is an excellent one because it keeps the concerns which attempt opposition
in a nervous and excited condition since they never know where the next attack
may be made, and since it keeps them all the time changing their machines and
causes them ultimately, in order that they may not be sued, to adopt inefficient
forms of apparatus.
N.R. DANIELIAN, A.T.&T. THE STORY OF INDUSTRIAL CONQUEST, 98 (1939).
133. See id. at 104-05.
134. See id. at 105-07.
135. See id. at 114-116.
136. See id.
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Finally, in 1926, AT&T entered into a license agreement with the
radio group whereby AT&T agreed to withdraw from the radio broad-
cast, phonograph, and motion picture markets, and provide its wire
service to the other companies at reduced rates. In exchange, AT&T re-
ceived exclusive licenses for all GE, RCA, and Westinghouse two-way
wireless telephony patents, so that wireless telephony became the exclu-
sive field of AT&T, which also gained a monopoly of both domestic and
international radio telephony.'37 "The inescapable result of the ... pool-
ing arrangement ... was not to create competition for markets, but to
monopolize the exploitation of improved equipment and to give a free
hand to particular companies to press or delay, as interests dictated, the
development of new industries under protection of monopoly."' 38 By
amassing and refusing to use its patent rights, and by building a monop-
oly position for itself, AT&T suppressed wireless telephony for over
four decades. We suspect that AT&T may have done so due to its sunk
costs in its existing technology and infrastructure, out of fear of encour-
aging new entrants to the potential market for wireless telephony, and in
order to avoid disrupting the status quo in the radio broadcast market.
C. Patent Abuse
Patent abuse occurs when the patentee misuses the patent for anti-
competitive purposes, including such practices as patent consolidation,
patent pooling, and creation of patent thickets.'39 Patent consolidation
seeks to gain control of key patents held by others with the goal of in-
fluencing or slowing the development of competing technologies.
40
Pooling occurs when a group of patentees collude to cross license each
other so as to dominate the market for a technology by preventing new
competition from outside the group. 4 1 Patent thickets (sometimes
known as "patent blankets" or "patent blitzkrieg") involves amassing a
large number of patents with the intent to "fence in" or "block" the path
of would-be competitors in their efforts to invent around the patented
137. See id. at 126-32.
138. See id. at 132.
139. See Dunford, supra note 5, at 517.
140. See id.
141. See id. Although pooling arrangements may have anti-competitive effects when
they involve output restraints, market division, collusive pricing, and technology suppres-
sion, they may also yield pro-competitive benefits. For instance, patent pools, accompanied
by cross-licensing, may promote technology diffusion by integrating complementary tech-
nologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing technology blockages, and avoiding expensive
infringement suits. See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, U.S.
Dept. of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, § 5.5 (1995).
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technology.12 While these activities are not illegal in themselves, they
may become abusive and unlawful when used with the intent to stifle
competition.4 1 Instances involving patent abuse are evident in the histo-
ries of the electric lamp and chemical industries.
1. The Electric Lamp Industry and Fluorescent Lighting
The collusive nature of the light industry led to delay of improve-
ments in incandescent lighting and the suppression of fluorescent lamps.
Following the patenting of the first incandescent electric lamp in 1880,
the manufacture of electric lamps evolved from a craft to a highly
mechanized and automated process. Firms in the industry needed a large
investment of fixed capital and specialized plants with a high proportion
of overhead costs and low labor costs per unit produced.'" These condi-
tions, along with the inelastic demand for electric lamps where a
decrease in price was not accompanied by an increase in demand, made
competition unattractive and cartelization more appealing.4 4 General
Electric (GE) took the lead in the U.S. lamp industry and GE "officials
frequently ... placed on record their fear of impending competition and
their intention to use cross licensing patent agreements to build a market
structure so stable that the expiration of General Electrics' basic patents
could not shake it.'
46
By the 1920s, in order to bolster its position in the lighting industry,
GE had entered into cross-licensing agreements with its competitors to
divide domestic markets, fix prices, and regulate exports. 4 ' An
international cartel was formed to exchange patents and technical
information and to divide markets. The cartel established a testing lab in
Switzerland for the stated purpose of standardizing quality. However, the
standardization program had the actual purpose of increasing sales by
eliminating quality competition in the sale of lamps and by limiting or
reducing the life of lamps. 4 Later, during the Depression and World War
142. See Dunford, supra note 5, at 517.
143. Many other variants of abuse exist. "[B]litzkrieg is facilitated by the use of 'um-
brella patents' (patents that are so broad as to prevent the development of similar products),
'accordion patents' (patents that begin with the single invention but expand to include prod-
ucts and processes used in association with it), and 'bottleneck patents' (patents that control
the use of inventions without which the industry cannot operate)." Id. For further discussion
of antitrust issues as to patent accumulation, see Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 73, at 557-
62.
144. See George W. Stocking & Myron W. Watkins, Cartels in Action: Case Studies in
International Business Diplomacy 305-12 (1946).
145. See id. at 325.
146. Id. at 327.
147. See id. at 308.
148. See id. at 351-55.
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II, suppression of longer life bulbs ended when the cartel began to break
down as patents expired and other competitors entered the market to sell
longer life bulbs.
The introduction of fluorescent lighting was similarly delayed. The
basic technology for fluorescent lighting was widely known in the
1920s, yet GE and Westinghouse, the leading U.S. manufacturers, de-
cided to saturate the incandescent light market before introducing the
new product.4 9 This delay was partly in response to pressure from elec-
tric utilities, which believed that the increased efficiency of fluorescent
lighting would lead to lower demand for electricity and reduced prof-
its.' 50 The two industries were highly interdependent. Since the
fluorescent lamp had been "acclaimed as several times more efficient
than incandescent lighting, there was a possibility that the lighting load
would be seriously affected ... [and so] the utilities seem to have
wished to retard the rate of introduction of fluorescent lighting."'"' Even-
tually, GE and Westinghouse released fluorescent lights into the market
in 1938 when a new competitor, Sylvania, successfully introduced fluo-
rescent lighting and threatened to emerge as the leading manufacturer
and seller of these bulbs.52
2. I.G. Farben, Standard Oil, and Synthetic Oil
Historically, major chemical companies preferred to collaborate,
settle their disputes peacefully, and equitably divide up their areas of
influence. Companies agree on changes to products and processes, and
it is unusual for one to competitively supplant another's product or
process. "Through pooling their knowledge, experience, and monopoly
privileges, chemical companies can eliminate costly litigation, increase
the fruitfulness of their research, and gain a tremendous advantage over
outside would-be innovators."'53 However, this spirit of collaboration
sometimes lent itself to anticompetitive collusion, and we see this in the
behavior of two leading chemical companies, prior to the Second World
War.
In 1929, I.G. Farben and Standard Oil entered into a mutual com-
mitment not to compete by recognizing the primacy of Standard in
petroleum and Farben in chemicals. Standard gained ownership and
control of Farben's existing and future hydrogenation processes outside
149. See Arthur A. Bright, The Electric-Lamp Industry: Technological Change and
Economic Development from 1800 to 1947 at 400-01 (1949).
150. See id. at 401.
151. Id.at401-402.
152. See id. at 404.
153. Stocking & Watkins, supra note 144, at 427.
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of Germany, and became a junior partner with Farben in the manufac-
ture of new chemical products derived from petroleum and natural
gas. 54 Once Standard acquired these patents, it exhibited little interest in
using the hydrogenation processes in production; rather, it was more
interested in blocking the threat of liquid fuels and coal lubricants to the
oil industry.'55 Standard then leveraged its rights to draw other petroleum
refining companies into patent pools, thereby extending its original
rights and discouraging synthetic production of liquid fuels and coal
lubricants.
In 1931, Farben developed a new synthetic oil product, known as
Paraflow, which was a pour-point depressant that reduces the tempera-
ture at which oil flows. In 1932, Standard obtained exclusive rights to
Paraflow from Farben, added complementary patents of its own, and
used these to eliminate any competition to Paraflow. One competing
product known as Santopour, which was more efficient and economical,
threatened to displace Paraflow. After reaching an agreement to acquire
the patent rights to Santopour, Standard considered either increasing the
price, or diluting the product in an in an internal memo:
We would have to tell a rather embarrassing story to explain the
marked change in either price or potency of Santopour, and the
real reason for the change would be obvious to the trade. Our
conclusion is, therefore, that the best policy is to retire San-
topour quickly and quietly as possible, and to market only
Paraflow of present potency.
56
Soon afterwards, Standard withdrew Santopour from the market and
proceeded to suppress it.
5 7
D. Horizontal Takeovers and Acquisitions
A horizontal merger or acquisition that creates or enhances market
power in an already highly concentrated market is likely to be unlawful
under the federal antitrust laws. 58 The courts determine the legality of
such a merger by defining the "relevant market" and estimating the
154. See id. at 491.
155. See id. at 492.
156. Id. at 498 (quoting, Patents, Hearings before the Committee on Patents, 77th
Cong. 1824 (1941).
157. See id. ("Our conclusion is, therefore, that the best policy is to retire Santopour as
quickly and as quietly as possible, and to market only Paraflow of present potency.").
158. Horizontal mergers occur between competitors where the two firms that are com-
bining formerly stood in a competitive relationship, i.e., they sold the same product or a
close substitute in a shared geographic market. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 492 (2d ed. 1999).
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pre- and post-merger levels of concentration in the market. 9 "If one com-
pany acquires another while the latter is in control of the development of a
new technology, the former is placed in a position to suppress the devel-
opment of that technology. ' 6 The Johnson & Johnson cases, discussed
below, address takeovers by a leading firm in a current product market and
a potential competitor in a new product market. In each case, the potential
competitor, StimTech in the first case and Meditemp in the second case,
was not a participant in the current product market, but endeavored to de-
velop a next-generation product that would displace a current product.
1. Johnson & Johnson: The TENS Device
The case of McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson,161 concerned Stim-
Tech, a small corporation that had been formed to develop and market a
transcutaneous electronic nerve stimulation (TENS) device to control
pain through the use of electrical impulses. Essential to the success of
StimTech's marketing strategy was the securing of additional financing.
Johnson & Johnson learned of StimTech's need for additional capital
and approached its owners with an offer to acquire StimTech in ex-
change for a promise to market the TENS device. The original owners of
StimTech were to become employees.63 After the owners agreed to the
sale, Johnson & Johnson imposed a number of highly restrictive meas-
ures - including a hiring freeze, a cap on R&D funding, and inventory
reduction-on StimTech that prevented any expansion in sales of the
TENS device and eliminated further research directed toward refine-
ment of the device. 16'
As a result, StimTech incurred operating losses of $7.3 million and
its original owners were forced out. 65 They sued, alleging that Johnson
& Johnson had violated the antitrust laws by acquiring StimTech to sup-
press the TENS device and thereby eliminate competition with Johnson
& Johnson's pain control medication products.' 66 The court refused to
159. The analytical approach applied by the courts follows that used by the Federal
Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552
(Sept. 10, 1992). The relevant market is defined by a product or group of products and by the
geographic area in which the product is produced and sold. See id. § 1.0.
160. See Dunford, supra note 5, at 520.
161. 722 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1983). For a detailed analysis of this case, see Kurt. M.
Saunders, Diluting Our Antitrust Laws: Federal Standing Analysis Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, U. PITT. L. REV. 241 (1984).
162. See 722 F.2d at 1372 n.1.
163. See id. at 1372.
164. See id. at 1372-73.
165. See id. at 1373.
166. See id. at 1376.
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hear the case on the grounds that the owners had voluntarily sold Stim-
Tech and the patent rights to the TENS device and were now no longer
competitors with Johnson & Johnson. As such, the court ruled that they
no longer had a remedy under the antitrust laws.167 Although StimTech's
forced withdrawal from the TENS market may not have resulted in in-
jury to its competitors, the suppression of StimTech benefited Johnson
& Johnson by reducing competition in the pain control market.
68
2. Johnson & Johnson: The Meditemp Thermometer
The facts and pattern of conduct leading to the Turner v. Johnson &
Johnson69 case are strikingly similar to those in the McDonald case.
Turner, president of American Medical Electronics Corp. (AMEC), in-
vented, manufactured, and marketed an electronic thermometer known
as Meditemp. In 1975, AMEC and Johnson & Johnson began negotiat-
ing for the purchase of AMEC's assets. Johnson & Johnson, already
developing its own electronic thermometer called Survalent, promised
to promote the development and sale of Meditemp.
7'
After the acquisition, Johnson & Johnson refused to provide suffi-
cient funding or support to develop and successfully market Meditemp;
and in 1979, Johnson & Johnson discontinued Meditemp. 72 Turner sued,
asserting fraud and antitrust violations by Johnson & Johnson to gain
control of AMEC in order to suppress the device and eliminate AMEC
as a competitor in the thermometer market.77 The court dismissed the
antitrust claim for lack of standing as the court in the McDonald case
had done, but allowed the fraud claim to go to trial.
74
E. Exclusive Licensing Arrangements
An exclusive license is one by which the patentee agrees to grant a
license to another and not to any other third parties. 71 When a patentee
is unable or unwilling to work a patent, he or she may grant an exclusive
license to a firm that expresses an interest in developing and marketing
167. See id. at 1376-79.
168. See Saunders, supra note 161, at 259.
169. 549 F Supp. 807 (D. Mass. 1982).
170. See id. at 809.
171. See id. at 811.
172. See id. at 810.
173. See id. at 809-10.
174. See id. at 811-12.
175. See JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 271 (2003).
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the invention. The exclusive licensee may then suppress the invention




1. Nestler v. Exxon Corp.: The Nested Plastic Bagging Device
Richard Nestler developed a nested plastic bagging device in the
mid-1960's. This device, which inserted polyethylene bags made from
petroleum resins inside one another, was to be located at grocery store
checkout counters to reduce the time and cost of packaging items. 177
Nestler established a factory, acquired private financing, and obtained a
machine from Sheldahl Co. to produce plastic bags for sale and to use
with his device.' In 1968, he entered into an exclusive licensing agree-
ment with Exxon, the largest petroleum producer in the U.S. Exxon
represented that it was interested in new markets for its petroleum resins
and agreed to finance the cost of developing a market for the bagging
device. Meanwhile, Exxon had learned that Sheldahl was to be the only
producer of the nested bag machine. Exxon secretly entered into an
agreement with Sheldahl to acquire control of the process for producing
nested bags. 179
Nestler later sued Exxon, claiming that Exxon failed and refused to
manufacture his device, to deliver the device and bags to customers, and
to expand production capacity. Nestler also claimed that Exxon failed to
provide customer information and capacity forecasts so that he could
make the innovation available to customers. He argued that Exxon de-
prived the public of the benefits of competition and the use of the
bagging device in that "Exxon undertook a calculated and planned pro-
gram to squeeze Nestler out of business ... leaving Exxon with control
of the U.S. license and Nestler excluded from obtaining a nested bag
machine to use in competition with Exxon. .. o
The federal district court granted summary judgment and found that
there was no breach of the licensing agreement because the payment of
royalties was dependent upon production of the device.' 8 ' In addition,
the court found that there was not enough evidence to conclude that
Exxon's purpose was to achieve an unreasonable restraint of trade and
176. Previously, we discussed instances of patent abuse and nonuse such as I.G. Farben
and AT&T. These cases also involved exclusive licensing arrangements. See supra notes
132-38 & 153-57 and accompanying text.
177. See Nestler v. Exxon Corp., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,876, 68,832 (D.D.C.
1976).
178. See id. at 68,834.
179. See id. at 68,832-834.
180. Id. at 68,834-35.
181. See id. at 68,834.
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held that the licensing agreement allowed Nestler to produce the device
if Exxon did not produce nested bags. 82 The court apparently over-
looked the fact that Exxon had control over the raw materials for plastic
bags (i.e., oil resins) and, through its alliance with Sheldahl, also con-
trolled the sole means of production. Even if Nestler was free to produce
his nested bagging device, it would be useless without plastic bags.
2. Bloch v. SmithKline Beckman Corp.:
The MgK Dietary Supplement
Dr. Maurice Bloch, a medical researcher, licensed his product idea
for a dietary supplement to his employer, SmithKline. In 1974, they
agreed to a licensing arrangement for the development, marketing, and
patenting of the MgK dietary supplement, containing magnesium and
potassium compounds for use in diuretic therapy.'83 Bloch confidentially
disclosed "his idea that the amount of potassium in the body changes in
proportion to the amount of magnesium in the body.""' At that time,
most diuretic drugs on the market were potassium-depleting, which led
to various adverse side effects, such as fatigue, dizzy spells and confu-
sion.'85 SmithKline agreed that if it did not further develop MgK in the
United Kingdom, or did not apply for a product license, it would give up
its exclusive rights to Bloch. Moreover, if SmithKline obtained a prod-
uct license but did not market within twelve months of the grant of the
license, it would also relinquish exclusive rights to Bloch. 86 Later, when
SmithKline failed to use the rights to the drug, Bloch sued for fraud and
antitrust violations.
Bloch asserted that MgK had been suppressed because of potential
competition with Dyazide, SmithKline's product. Specifically, he con-
tended that: (1) SmithKline intentionally frustrated clinical studies that
would have confirmed Bloch's test results; (2) SmithKline falsely led
Bloch to believe that testing and development of MgK as a marketable
product was continuing, in order to prevent Bloch from asserting his
right to reacquire the product idea; (3) SmithKline suppressed its own
test results that longtime use of Dyazide depleted magnesium led to po-
tassium depletion; and (4) SmithKline committed patent fraud by
continuing to misrepresent and not reveal its test results concerning
182. See id. at 68,836
183. See Bloch v. SmithKline Beckman Corp., No. CIV A. 82-510, 1988 WL 117927
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1988).
184. Id. at *1.
185. See id.
186. See id. at *3.
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Dyazide.'8' After reviewing the evidence, the court believed that there
was a genuine issue of material fact that the alleged suppression had
occurred. The court also found that Bloch had standing to sue because
SmithKline was "purposely obstructing the development of a potentially
competitive product" and because Bloch could have marketed MgK
without SmithKline.'
88
F. Exceptions to the General Rule
Although it remains the general rule that there is no prohibition
against patent nonuse or suppression of a patented technology,189 excep-
tions have been made in the cases of health, safety, and the environment.
For instance, in City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge,'90 the inventor of
an apparatus for treating raw sewage by aeration sued the City of Mil-
waukee for patent infringement, even though he was not working the
patent. The court found that the patent had indeed been infringed, but
refused to issue a permanent injunction since it would have led to the
closing of the sewage plant and forced the city to dump raw sewage into
Lake Michigan, causing pollution and a public health hazard.' 9'
Likewise, in Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation,92 the inventor of a process that enriched oleomargarine with
Vitamin D through irradiation refused to license the patented process so
as not to compete with butter, which naturally contains the vitamin. Al-
though the court invalidated the patent and so avoided dealing with the
issue of suppression, it made note of evidence indicating the importance
of the process in preventing scurvy and rickets in low-income consum-
ers, stating that the refusal to license a patent such as this was a "public
offense."'93 Similarly, in Bliss v. Brooklyn,'9 the owner of a patent on a
fire hose coupling, who had chosen not to use or license, was unable to
obtain an injunction against the city's use of the coupling. The court
explained that the safety of its citizens was more important in that the
coupling was necessary for the city's use in preventing fires.' 95
These few cases demonstrate that the courts are only willing to re-
quire the compulsory licensing of a patent when the public interest is at
187. See id.
188. Id. at *5.
189. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
190. 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934).
191. See id. at 593.
192. 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945).
193. Id. at 945.
194. 3 F. Cas. 706 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1871).
195. See id. at 707.
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stake. Congress has been similarly circumspect in addressing this issue.
In only a few instances has Congress required the working of a patent.
Under the Clean Air Act, a court may order a patentee of an air pollution
control technology to license it when there are no alternative technolo-
gies available, and the lack of an alternative may create a monopoly that
substantially lessens competition.' 96 Similarly, the Atomic Energy Act
forbids the holder of a patent affected with the public interest from pre-
venting the use of its invention.
97
These exceptions, whether created judicially or legislatively, dem-
onstrate that use of a patented technology has been required in limited
circumstances. The exceptions have favored health, safety, and the envi-
ronment-all of which are considered to be in the public interest.
Nonetheless, the courts and Congress continue to maintain that patents
are private property, even though these exceptions are clearly tied to the
public interest.
VII. POTENTIAL DETERRENTS TO TECHNOLOGY SUPPRESSION
The notion of the lone inventor working in a garage workshop is in-
creasingly romantic and quaint. In fact, today's R&D and patenting
processes are more a matter of corporate investment than the avocation
of individual inventors. Given this reality, we believe that it is time to
revisit the original intent behind the patent laws to ensure that the laws
remain faithful to their purpose-disclosure and diffusion of new inven-
tions.
We have demonstrated that technology suppression occurs, even
though the management literature does not acknowledge its existence,
and the courts have been reluctant to view this conduct as unlawful. By
necessity, remedies for technology suppression are limited and must be
conceived of in the short term through contractual provisions, and in the
longer term through technology policy and forcing and changes to cur-
rent law.
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000).
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 2183. For examples of other compulsory patent licensing provi-
sions, see, e.g., Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. § 901-14, Tennessee Valley
Authority Act, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (r), Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2404, Helium Act,
50 U.S.C. § 167b, Coal Research & Development Act, 30 U.S.C. § 666, Arms Control &
Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2572, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3253(c).
Fall 20041
64 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 11:23
TABLE 2
SHORT AND LONG-TERM DETERRENTS
Our goal here is to suggest steps that individuals and policy makers
can take to decrease the likelihood of suppression. This is important for
innovators or entrepreneurs who want to increase the chances that their
innovations will not be suppressed as a result of acquisition or merger,
exclusive licensing arrangements, or an in-house decision to shelve an
invention. Likewise, R&D managers responsible for bringing products
to market are operating in a domain where their own organization, or a
competitor's, may be the victim or perpetrator of suppressive tactics.
A. Contractual Provisions
When a contractual agreement exists between two parties related to
the development and use of a patented technology, provisions to guard
against suppression may be inserted. The use of such provisions is ap-
propriate in three settings. First, a firm enters into a licensing agreement
with an inventor for a patented technology. Second, one party enters into
an agreement by which it merges with or acquires another party, which
may also own a patented technology. Third, an employer acquires rights
in an invention created by an employee through a license or an assign-
ment.
An inventor may license a patented technology to another. If so, the
inventor can either decline to grant an exclusive license for an extended
period of time, or seek to obtain an exclusive license that builds in pro-
visions that discourage suppression of the innovation. For example, the
agreement can specify that the license is conditioned upon development
and commercialization, and can be revoked if the licensee does not do
so within a specified period. This strategy is roughly equivalent to creat-
ing a privately fashioned, compulsory use requirement. Inventors should
not presume that a standard-form licensing agreement will meet their
needs.
Time Frame Deterrents
Short Term contractual provisions
Long Term technology policy & forcing




B. Technology Policy and Forcing
Technology forcing, including such measures as subsidies and in-
centives, promotes innovation. Indirectly, these measures also reduce
the likelihood of the suppression of targeted technologies. In the United
States, technology policy is a controversial subject; however, "critical
technologies" have long been promoted. Initially, the concept of critical
technologies was tied to the development of superior weapon systems-
a means "to guard scientific knowledge about technology to protect na-
tional security."'9' Many technology forcing regulations are related to
environmental protection. '" Subsequently, the concept has been ex-
panded to encompass a commitment to national growth and prosperity.
The government's pledge to foster competitiveness through coop-
eration and technology policy has had a direct impact on industry.
Partnerships of two kinds have resulted: between government and indus-
try, and between industry competitors. For example, in response to
Japanese semiconductor manufacturers flooding the American chip
market during the mid 80s, SEMATECH (SEmiconductor MAnufactur-
ing TECHnology) was launched in 1987. This cooperative effort
engaged fourteen leading American companies and the U.S. govern-
ment, and had as its goal the restoration of American leadership in
semiconductor manufacturing. 200 Similarly, the Microelectronics and
Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) was created in 1982 to se-
cure and enhance U.S. technological competitiveness in computers
against the Japanese.2' All of these examples demonstrate the effective-
ness of technology and competitiveness policy-and function as an
indirect deterrent for suppression. The matter of technology policy and
forcing, however, is beyond the control of individuals and the private
sector. Rather, the government determines which sectors of the economy
are seen as critical or strategic, thereby making suppression less likely
in those areas.
198. Linda D. Soloman & Simon E. Schoch, Developing Critical Technologies, 9 Comp.
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 153, 153 (1993).
199. See Alan S. Miller, Environmental Regulation, Technological Innovation, and
Technology-Forcing, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 64 (1995).
200. See Michelle K. Lee & Mavis K. Lee, High Technology Consortia: A Panacea for
America's Technological Competitiveness Problems?, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 335 (1991).
201. See Gibson, D. V. & Everett Rogers, R&D Collaboration on trial: The story of
MCC-America's first major for-profit R&D consortium and its quest for competitiveness of
American high-tech firms. (1994). SEMATECH would likely have been regarded as a combi-
nation in violation of the antitrust laws but for the initiative of the federal government in
fostering its formation, and through the National Cooperative Research and Production Act
of 1984 (Public Law 98-462).
Fall 20041
66 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 11:23
C. Changes to Existing Law
1. Compulsory Licensing
An existing mechanism that could be applied to the problem of sup-
pression involves the use of compulsory licensing, whereby a court
orders a patent owner (who is not using a patent) to license the patent to
someone who wishes to use it.202 When a compulsory license is ordered,
the court must also determine the royalty that the licensee must pay to
the patent owner.20° The remedy of compulsory licensing has been sug-
gested by many others2 4 and is used in other nations;25 however, there is
continued resistance to wider use of compulsory licensing under U.S.
law.2 6 We propose that this form of relief would only be invoked when
the patent owner was acting in bad faith or with an anticompetitive pur-
pose.27 The table below summarizes common arguments in favor of and
against compulsory licensing:
202. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 47, at § 2G[3].
203. See id.
204. See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The
Role of Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 977 (1977); Tom Arnold & Paul Janicke,
Compulsory Licensing Anyone?, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 149 (1973); A. Jason Mirabito, Com-
pulsory Patent Licensing for the United States: A Current Proposal, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
404 (1975).
205. For an analysis of the approach to compulsory licensing in the European Union,
see Maurits Dolmans, Restrictions on Innovation: An EU Antitrust Approach, 66 ANTITRUST
L. J. 455 (1998).
206. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs), to
which the U.S. is a signatory as a member of the World Trade Organization, expressly per-
mits the use of compulsory licensing for limited periods of time in situations involving
public emergency or extreme urgency. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property, Part II, Art. 31, 1996, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-
e/ trips.e/t agm3_e.htm) For a detailed discussion of compulsory licensing under Article 31
of the TRIPs Agreement, see Carlos Correa, The GA77Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights: New Standards for Patent Protection, 16 EURO. INTELL.
PRoP. REV. 327, 331-33 (1994).
207. Under circumstances of bad faith, an approach to compulsory licensing could
consist of the following factors. Patent owners would be allowed a period of exclusivity of
three to four years. Evidence of bad faith or anticompetitive behavior and a demonstration of
how the public interest would be served by the invention are also required. Once these condi-
tions have been met, a reasonable royalty can be determined. Royalties should account for
R&D and related legal costs, risks undertaken in first producing the invention, potential mar-
ket price and profit margin, and advertising and administrative expenses. We recognize that
these factors may be difficult to quantify and are subject to interpretation and evaluation,




OBJECTIONS TO COMPULSORY COUNTERARGUMENTS
LICENSING
Compulsory licensing reduces the There is no evidence that patent
inventor's incentive to develop, protection stimulates invention
Inventors who do not wish to
use/disclose can maintain invention as a
trade secret
Compulsory licensing is unconstitutional: Courts and the Congress have already
a patent is an exclusive property right, approved compulsory licenses for
which cannot to be taken without certain inventions deemed to be in the
compensation. public interest.
Compulsory licensing will hurt the U.S. in We are now competing in a global
international trade. (A license issued to a economy.
foreign competitor with cheaper This is an issue only if you fail to work
production costs could encroach upon your patent or refuse to license to a
the American competitor's market.) domestic competitor.
U.S., as signatory to World Trade Other signatories, with compulsory
Organization's Agreement on Trade- licensing laws already in place, have
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, successfully modified these laws in
is restricted to using compulsory compliance with the WTO Agreement.
licenses for limited periods of time in
situations involving public emergency or
extreme urgency.
Impossible to compute reasonable Compulsory licensing systems of other
royalties fairly and accurately. Presumes nations, & many proposals offer practical
that courts can precisely set a royalty starting points for computing royalties.
that fairly reflects the future commercial
value of the patent.
The debate on compulsory licensing continues. Most recently, sev-
eral members of the U.S. House of Representatives unsuccessfully
proposed the "Affordable Prescription Drugs and Medical Inventions
Act.' 2 8 This bill sought to require a patent owner who is not using an
invention relating to health care, and who is engaged in anticompetitive
behavior, to license the patent when the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and the Federal Trade Commission determine that doing so is
in the public interest.2'
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2. Antitrust Law
We have previously noted the tension between the patent and anti-
trust laws; nonetheless,20 we propose that antitrust law can be more
liberally applied to offer a deterrent to suppression. The purpose of anti-
trust law is to promote competition. However, patent suppression can
and has been used as an anticompetitive strategy. When suppression oc-
curs, not only is competition harmed, but one of the original purposes of
the patent laws is defeated: inventions are not disclosed and diffused to
the public. In instances where a patent owner also has monopoly
211power, patent suppression should be treated as a violation of the fed-
eral antitrust laws and subject to the remedies that these laws provide to
those who have been injured.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Most people accept that suppression occurs and can easily name an
example or two of inventions that have been allegedly suppressed:
runless pantyhose, intermittent windshield wipers, color in motion pic-
tures, and long-lasting light bulbs. All of these are a part of technology
folklore. Some argue that in the long run, beneficial or valuable innova-
tions will always see the light of day. Why care then about technology
suppression? As Justice Douglas contended in his dissenting opinion in
Special Equipment Co. v. Coe,1 2 there are important reasons for not
condoning patent suppression. In addition to undercutting the economic
and public policy rationale for the existence of the patent system, Justice
Douglas saw suppression as unconstitutional and contrary to the purpose
of the Patent Act:
The use of a new patent is suppressed so as to preclude experi-
mentation which might result in further invention by competitors.
A whole technology is blocked off. The result is a clog to our
economic machine and a barrier to an economy of abundance....
Can the suppression of patents which arrest progress of technol-
ogy be said to promote that progress? It is likewise difficult to see
how suppression of patents can be reconciled with the provision
of the statute which authorizes a grant of the "exclusive right to
210. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
211. Monopoly power is a high degree of power to influence prices and control output
within a relevant market and is not necessarily a function of firm size. See Hovenkamp, su-
pra note 108, at 269-72.
212. 324 U.S. 370 (1945)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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make, use, and vend the invention or discovery." How may the
words "make, use, and vend" be read to mean "not to make, not
to use, and not to vend?"
213
Suppression takes many guises and is not restricted to a single tac-
tic. In addition, suppression is only evident after the fact-once it is
uncovered or no longer occurring. Thus, it is very difficult to detect and
nearly impossible to predict. However, there is value in better aligning
the patent system with its goal of encouraging innovation and competi-
tion. Unless we reckon with the longstanding conceptual incompatibility
within patent law-between seeing a patent as private property versus
seeing the same patent as public privilege-this value will not be real-
ized . 4 We argue against seeing patents exclusively as private property,
and in favor of a balanced perspective that is more mindful of the nature
of patents as public privilege.
The consequences of suppression, as we have shown, are more se-
vere in the information age and the global economy. An array of federal2151
statutes, 2'5 as well as the TRIPs Agreement,216 have acknowledged the
role of compulsory licensing in the public interest and that without
compulsory licensing, patents that are necessary to alleviate health, en-
vironmental, and security could be shelved under the auspices of private
property rights. There is significant risk when such innovations, pri-
vately owned and protected by a patent, can be held hostage or held
back from the public and the marketplace for anticompetitive reasons.
The advent of the information revolution, in tandem with the expanding
scope of patentable subject matter, underscore the need to accord greater
weight to the public interest in technology suppression.
213. Id. at 382-83.
214. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 206.
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